

Mirjana M. Mišković-Luković¹
University of Kragujevac
Faculty of Philology and Arts

GETTING IT ACROSS THE TABLE: THE MANIFESTLY DISCOURSE ADVERBIALS REVISITED

The paper reconsiders the semantic and pragmatic roles of a subset of parenthetical linguistic expressions that typically go under a general heading of sentence (or sentential) adverbs (or adverbials) or pragmatic markers. The subset comprises expressions that encode the speaker's strongest subjective stance to the proposition expressed by the utterance (e.g. the English expressions *obviously*, *clearly*, *evidently*, *certainly* and *surely*, and their Serbian counterparts *očigledno*, *jasno*, *sigurno* and *svakako*).

Given the main, theoretic, orientation of the paper, however, the contrastive issue had to be neglected. Still, the paper gives an impetus for contrastive studies, in particular, regarding the encoded linguistic meaning in relation to interactional import. An accumulation of contrastive data, and analyses thereof, will contribute not only to re-evaluating and refining what we have come to know about encoded meaning, but also, and more importantly, to solving the contentious issue of the strict conceptual/procedural dichotomy.

Key words: cognitive pragmatics, discourse adverbials, judgements, mutual manifestness, relevance, sociopragmatics

1. INTRODUCTION

There is an apparent tug-of-war between the aim of my paper and the contrastive thematic issue of this journal. Still, they are not conflicting, especially to the extent my underestimation of contrastive nuances is offset by my findings and argumentation. An explorative path may widely be opened for further, more contrastively, oriented studies; after all, this boils down to the never-ending issue of the universality of linguistic phenomena.

The topic of my paper is concerned with a subset of the so-called *discourse adverbials* (or *sentence adverbials*)² which pertain to the lexical

1 mirjanamiskovic@yahoo.co.uk

2 The choice of the terms reflects specific theoretical considerations. Namely, in terms of communicative import, *discourse adverbial* seems to be a more appropriate term given that the other is more tied to the traditional preoccupations of a syntactic theory, and various ramifications thereof. In relevance theory, for instance, *sentence adverb(ial)* is typically used, but then again, the theory is far more concerned with explaining the very possibility of communication than with the social side of the coin (Mišković-Luković and Dedaić 2010).

field of manifestness.³ However, given that the topic is summarily reflected in the title, a few words might be in order.

First and foremost, my title suggests that there is a set of synonymous discourse adverbials that have a distinct sociopragmatic function. In other words, apart from their VP internal syntactic counterparts and coded meaning, they further indicate a particular discursive, or interactional, meaning. Secondly, I have deliberately chosen to name the set by the umbrella adverbial *manifestly*; even though this form is no longer widespread in use (albeit because of that) it, nonetheless, reflects the core (i.e. linguistic-semantic) meaning of the related bunch of adverbials. Thirdly, the blending of the English expressions *get across (something to someone)* and *reach across the table* reflects the purpose – the speaker's intention to communicate something to her addressee by her use of a *manifestly* discourse adverbial.⁴ Finally, *revisited* in the title summarises the proper scope and aim of my paper, representing its theoretical pivot.

The paper is organised around the following sections: section (2) illustrates the linguistic phenomena under investigation; section (3) presents two different approaches to the subject of my paper; section (4) highlights the theoretical underpinnings relevant to my analysis and discussion (4.1) and offers a modified relevance-theoretic approach (4.2); section (5) is a summary tracing a path for further (contrastive) research.

2. THE MANIFESTLY DISCOURSE ADVERBIALS

The following examples serve as an illustration in order to get a clearer picture of the linguistic phenomena at hand:⁵

- (1) She was, obviously, in a very emotional state.
- (2) He was found in the garden of the house – dead but untouched by explosion, and as there was no sign of violence it was presumed that he had been suffocated by a damp cloth's being held over his mouth. So, clearly, it was a case of murder.
- (3) Evidently, she had nothing to do with the whole affair.
- (4) Certainly, she would not like it if they were involved with Leicester.
- (5) As for him, I could not be sure how much was real affection, how much ambition. Surely, he was not still hoping for marriage – but even if he were not, he needed to keep her favour.

3 The term *lexical* field evokes the structural semantics perspective, but is used here as a convenient shorthand considering that my paper is couched within the relevance-theoretic framework of a radically modular approach to mind, and henceforth to cognition.

4 Following the standard practice of relevance theory, the pronouns *she* and *he* are used here for convenience to refer to the speaker and addressee, respectively, so as to avoid cumbersome references.

5 The English data have randomly been taken from fiction, TV media and the Internet (e.g. Google and oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com). However, given the predominantly theoretical nature of my paper, hypothetical examples are also used as typical of inferential theories of communication (Gricean and post-Gricean alike).

The list, of course, may be expanded to include other discourse adverbials, such as *decidedly*, *doubtless*, *undoubtedly*, etc. and their variant constructions such as *no doubt*, *for sure* or *it+be+adjectival form* (e.g. *it is obvious/clear/evident/certain/sure that...*). Likewise, there is a number of corresponding synonymous Serbian constructions, such as *očigledno*, *jasno*, *sigurno*, *nesumnjivo*, *van (svake) sumnje* and *očigledno/jasno/sigurno/nesumnjivo je da...* etc. The expansion of the list, however, is not crucial for the main thread of my argumentation.

3. DELINEATING THE ISSUE

3.1. FRASER'S APPROACH

Fraser (1996) was among the first to give a comprehensive classification of the so-called *pragmatic markers*. Relying on various theoretical strands (e.g. neo-Gricean, relevance-theoretic and sociopragmatic), Fraser starts by defining pragmatics as:

[A]n account of the process by which the language user takes a sentence representation provided by the grammar and, given the context in which the sentence is uttered, determines what messages and what effects the speaker has conveyed.

(Fraser: 1996: 167)

Essential to his classification is the hypothesis that “sentence meaning, the information encoded by linguistic expressions, can be divided up into two separate and distinct parts” (Fraser 1996: 167). One is the propositional content (“content meaning”), the other “everything else” (i.e. pragmatic markers). So, according to Fraser (1996: 168), pragmatic markers are “the linguistically encoded clues which signal the speaker’s potential communicative intentions”.

The discourse adverbials as in (1)–(5), together with other expressions (e.g. *conceivably*, *perhaps*, *possibly*, *seemingly*, *without question* and *it is perhaps the case that...*) are then classified as *evidential markers*, more precisely, they fall within a broader class of *commentary markers* “which signal the degree of confidence, positive or negative, weakly or strongly, held by the speaker about the truth of the basic message” (Fraser 1996: 181–182).

Fraser (1996) is neither a relevance-theoretic nor a neo-Gricean pragmatist.⁶ However, working within his idiosyncratic framework, he, nonetheless, relies on some of the crucial, inferential pragmatic notions, most notably, (*communicative*) *intention* and *signalling*. The latter, in particular, if translated into relevance-theoretic terms, poses a problem –

6 Moreover, Fraser (1996), sporadically, opposes even sociopragmatic accounts of the so-called *discourse markers*; for instance, Schiffrin’s analysis of *y’know*.

that of the distinction between conceptual/procedural linguistic encoding. To this issue I return in my analysis in section (4).

3.2. THE RELEVANCE-THEORETIC APPROACH

Contrary to Fraser, whose classification lumps together various linguistic expressions irrespective of their different semantic roles, relevance theory has provided a heuristics for an overall classification of linguistically encoded meaning based on the semantics (encoded/metaphysical)/pragmatics (inferential) distinction (see, for example, Blakemore 1987, 2004 and Carston 2002).

In a nutshell, the relevance-theoretic account goes as follows. Linguistic forms may exhibit different combinations of semantic and pragmatic roles (see the table below).

<i>What does a linguistic form encode?</i>	<i>Does a linguistic form contribute to the truth conditions of an utterance?</i>	<i>At which communicative level does a linguistic form function?</i>
LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS	TRUTH-CONDITIONAL SEMANTICS (i.e. "REAL"-WORLD SEMANTICS)	PRAGMATICS
conceptual meaning	truth-conditional contribution	explicit (basic explicature, higher-level explicature)
procedural meaning	non-truth-conditional contribution	implicit (implicature: premises and conclusions)

Conceptually encoded meaning provides constituents for the representational content of an utterance – that of the basic explicature (i.e. the proposition expressed by an utterance) or of a higher-level explicature (i.e. various higher-order representations under which the basic explicature may be embedded, such as mood indicators, word order, and other linguistic phenomena). Procedurally encoded meaning, by contrast, constrains pragmatic inference in the process of interpretation – at the explicit level of communication (e.g. deictic expressions or tense markers) and implicit (e.g. various pragmatic connectives or particles). On the other hand, basic and higher-level explicatures as well as implicated premises and conclusions are all propositions, which means that they can be true or

false *per se*. However, the truth and falsity of an utterance solely pertains to its propositional, declarative, content⁷ (i.e. to the basic explicature).

We may sketch now the standard relevance-theoretic classification of sentence adverbials. Namely, they contribute conceptually encoded meanings, by forming higher-level explicatures, such that the meanings communicate different ways our mind entertains propositions expressed by our utterances: attitudinal, illocutionary, evidential and hearsay adverbials. Not only do they differ in the specific meanings their respective classes encode, but also in their truth-conditional contribution.⁸

Evidential adverbials, which fall within the focus of my paper, conceptually encode the speaker's commentary on (i.e. the speaker's evidence for) the reliability of the basic explicature. As such, they are considered to modify the basic explicature, and this, in turn, gives support for the claim about their truth-conditional contribution. The typical representatives of the class are the sentence adverbials *obviously*, *evidently*, *possibly*, *apparently*, *supposedly* and *seemingly*. The standard analysis is illustrated in (6)–(8):

- (6) a. Obviously, I'm going to miss the deadline.
 b. 'It is obvious/obviously true that the speaker is going to miss the deadline'
 c. 'The speaker strongly believes that she is going to miss the deadline'
- (7) a. Evidently, Frederick the Great entertained Voltaire at Sanssouci.
 b. It is evident that Frederick the Great entertained Voltaire at Sanssouci.
 c. The speaker strongly believes that Frederick the Great entertained Voltaire at Sanssouci.
- (8) a. Possibly, we're too late.
 b. It is possible that the speaker and the addressee are too late [for...]⁹
 c. The speaker weakly believes that the speaker and the addressee are too late [for...]

7 As a reminder, the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional issue is not specific to the relevance-theoretic framework as it has been one of the pivotal notions in semiotics, formal semantics, the philosophy of language, etc.

8 Attitudinal adverbials (e.g. *(un)fortunately*, *happily*, *regrettably*, *sadly*) conceptually encode the speaker's attitude to the basic explicature (cf. corresponding synonymous Serbian expressions such as *nažalost*, *srećom*, *tužno je da [...]* etc.). Illocutionary adverbials (e.g. *frankly*, *seriously*, *confidentially*) conceptually encode the illocutionary force of the speaker's utterance (cf. corresponding synonymous Serbian expressions such as *iskreno*, *ozbiljno*, *u poverenju*). Hearsay adverbials (e.g. *allegedly*, *reportedly*) conceptually encode that the speaker is not the source of the information stated in the basic explicature (cf. corresponding synonymous Serbian expressions such as *navodno*, *kaže se da [...]*, *prenosimo*, *rečeno je da [...]*). In terms of truth-conditional semantics, the situation varies with the non-truth-conditional attitudinal adverbials at one extreme and the truth-conditional hearsay adverbials at the other. In between are illocutionary adverbials because of a limited subset of truth-conditional expressions (to these I return in section (4) when I discuss the truth-conditional issue in relation to the *manifestly* discourse adverbials).

9 The phrase *too late* requires a contextually provided constituent for the enrichment of the logical form of the uttered sentence to the fully propositional basic explicature.

Thus, utterances (6a)–(8a), which host *obviously*, *evidently* and *possibly*, inferentially trigger the formation of the respective higher-level explicatures (6b-c)–(8b-c) that comment on what the speaker sees as the degree of evidential support for the propositions expressed by the utterances. In other words, evidentials modify the proposition expressed and are, therefore, truth-conditional expressions.

What I want to challenge regarding the standard relevance-theoretic analysis hinges on the following: i) the strict dichotomy between conceptual/procedural encodings (and bearing in mind Fraser's (1996) use of *signalling*) and ii) the claim about the truth-conditional contribution. These points account for the use of the word *revisited* in the title. Furthermore, being a staunch relevance-theoretic linguist, however, my main aim can be none other than that of fine-tuning the standard analysis by bringing both inferential and social aspects of the topic to bear on further research into the so-called *evidentials*, either monolingually or contrastively. To these points I return in section (4).

4. THE MANIFESTLY DISCOURSE ADVERBIALS REVISITED

4.1. THE MAIN THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

Essential to my understanding of the meanings and roles of the *manifestly* discourse adverbials are the following dichotomies (Grice's is the first, relevance-theoretic the other two): a) meaning_{NN} vs. speaker meaning, b) informative vs. communicative intention and c) manifestness vs. mutual manifestness.¹⁰

Grice (1989) regards the meaning_{NN} of an expression (i.e. linguistic, or encoded, meaning) as not only subsequent to, but also dependent on what the speaker meant_{NN} by using the expression. The success of meaning_{NN} depends on the speaker's intention that her audience should recognise this intention and, moreover, adopt some belief, presumably the speaker's, based on the speaker's formulation of her utterance. Thus, for instance, declarative utterances induce belief.

Developing Grice's (central) notion of intention to account for utterance understanding, relevance theory has introduced two layers of intention (both are cognitive and non-representational) – informative (basic) and communicative (higher-order). Namely, the speaker makes (more) manifest a set of assumptions to her addressee (the informative intention) and the speaker intends to make it mutually manifest to the speaker and her addressee that the speaker has a particular informative

¹⁰ I have presented and discussed the relevance-theoretic approach to communication, especially in relation to various linguistic phenomena, throughout my published work (see, for instance, Mišković-Luković 2006a, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2015, 2015/2018). Of course, the main references remain Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) and Carston (2002).

intention (the communicative intention). Thus, if an addressee recovers the intended interpretation of the speaker's utterance, the speaker's communicative intention will succeed; if the addressee does not accept the propositional content of the speaker's utterance, the speaker's informative intention will fail.

Manifestness and mutual manifestness are intertwined as inseparable elements of an intentional (i.e. ostensive-inferential) communicative fabric. There is, however, a constant mental struggle at work between the two notions, evidently related to the informative and communicative types of intention.¹¹

Manifestness of an assumption to an individual is a matter of degree. An individual (say, an addressee in verbal communication) is (more or less) capable not only of (mentally) representing the assumption, but also of holding it as (probably) true at a given moment (say, the time of the speaker's utterance). In a mutual cognitive environment, however, each manifest assumption becomes also mutually manifest. Thus, in verbal communication, it becomes manifest both to the speaker and her addressee that they share a certain set of manifest assumptions.

4.2. FINE-TUNING THE RELEVANCE-THEORETIC ACCOUNT

In order to explain the semantic/pragmatic configuration of the *manifestly* discourse adverbials (henceforth, MDA for convenience) I shall go back to the table in (3.2).

4.2.1. LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS AND INFERENTIAL PRAGMATICS

It is indisputable that MDAs are conceptual linguistic expressions because they necessarily inherit the encoded meaning from their respective adjectival and VP internal adverbial counterparts, as illustrated in (9) and (10):

- (9) a. They show you such obvious respect.
b. He had never been able to see himself clearly.
c. She was pleased with Jago's evident support.
d. I was certain to help her.
e. Can you be sure?
- (10) a. Kakva očita laž!
b. Pa valjda možeš jasno da vidiš da te on očigledno zavlaci sve vreme.
c. Ma zašto si tako arogantno siguran u sebe!

But what specific linguistic meaning does my MDA set encode? Recall Fraser's and relevance-theoretic explanation of *evidentials* (pragmatic markers and sentence adverbials, respectively) in section (3). Common to

¹¹ Cf. the borderline case of phatic communion, for instance, where the speaker's communicative intention is emptied of the lower-order, informative intention.

both accounts is the speaker's commitment to the propositional content of her utterance (henceforth, P for short), namely, *saying that P* and *believing that P* (to a higher or lesser degree). *Saying that P*, and the concomitant belief attitude, is essential to the relevance-theoretic explanation of the mood indicators, here the declarative mood (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995). Given that the mood indicators are inferentially recovered in a procedural way, it might appear that there is no conflict with Fraser's use of *signalling*. But therein is the catch. To clarify, *signalling* and, more commonly, *indicating* are typically used in relevance theory to refer to those linguistically encoded meanings that serve as semantic constraints on relevance of the speaker's utterance. In other words, the terms are tied to various procedural linguistic items that indicate implicatures – premises or conclusions (see, for example, Blakemore 1987 and Mišković-Luković 2006a) and not to those linguistic phenomena that encode higher-level explicatures, such as evidentials (and other sentence adverbials). Having said this, I cannot but conclude that Fraser does not get it right. On the other hand, if his *signalling* is understood in terms of sociopragmatic meaning, I cannot but strongly agree. This point I leave for later.

To return to the question of the specific conceptual meaning of MDAs, my proposal is straightforward. Within the cognitive domain of manifestness (understood in the relevance-theoretic terms presented in (4.1)), MDAs fall within a broader group of epistemic expressions of judgements. I adopt here Bennett's (2002) position on judgements – irrespective of why the speaker feels whatever degree of confidence she has in P, or how she has arrived at this belief, she expresses how confident she is in P.

So, in terms of the linguistically encoded – *conceptual* – semantics, an MDA encodes the speaker's intentional, strongest attitude to P, such that P must necessarily be true from the speaker's (subjective) point of view based on her particular “beyond-reasonable-doubt-evidence” (be it perceptual, mental/deductive or contextual). This, of course, gives further support for the relevance-theoretic claim about the inferential development of the sort of higher-level explicatures illustrated in (6b-c)–(7b-c) in subsection (3.2). The following excerpt succinctly illustrates my conclusion:¹²

- (11) Carol Christie: He was hitting me against the pillar. I don't know how many times. I fainted. Obviously, I was unconscious.

In co-text (11), not only are the expressions *fainted* and *be unconscious* repeatedly (pleonastically) used, but also, and more importantly, they give credence to the speaker's evidence for her ill-treatment should anyone think of challenging it, especially in terms of the number of hitting. Although the start of the hitting process has been consciously evidenced by the speaker, the “how-many-times” remains undetermined in terms of

12 The example has been taken from the documentary “Who the (bleep) did I marry?”, which was released on the TV programme *ID* on December 23rd, 2022 (the interviewee is a battered wife).

duration and ending; hence the use of the MDA *obviously*, which, from the speaker's perspective, reinforces and justifies P in the given context.

4.2.2. TRUTH-CONDITIONAL SEMANTICS

So far, my modified account of the specific conceptually encoded meaning of MDAs, coupled with my position that they are judgements rather than evidentials, does not preclude the standard relevance-theoretic analysis of their inferential role in forming higher-level explicatures of the types illustrated in (6)–(7). However, what I want to challenge here is their truth-conditional contribution.

The situation with illocutionary adverbials serves as my starting point. As presented in section (3.2), illocutionary adverbials are non-truth-conditional expressions save for a small set that does contribute to P in a truth-conditional way (e.g. *on/off the record*, *morally*, *technically*, *in practice/reality*, and *suchlike*).

To illustrate, let us consider the following examples:

- (12) Rhett Butler to Scarlet O'Hara: Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn.
(13) Mr Simpson's associate: On the record, Mr Simpson killed his wife; off the record and morally, he didn't.

The truth-conditional difference between the illocutionary adverbials *frankly* in (12) and *on the record*, *off the record* and *morally* in (13) lies in what these adverbials actually modify. While *frankly* in (12) modifies the illocutionary verb of saying in the higher-level explicature ('Rhett Butler is saying/suggesting frankly that P') and, therefore, has no truth-conditional bearing on P (i.e. that Rhett Butler does not care about Scarlet O'Hara's circumstances (these would have to be contextually supplied to enrich Butler's utterance to its full propositional content)), *on the record*, *off the record* and *morally* in (13) modify P ('Mr Simpson's associate is saying that on the record P' and 'Mr Simpson's associate is saying that off the record and morally P'); otherwise the propositions expressed by the utterances in (13) would result in contradiction ('Mr Simpson killed his wife' and 'Mr Simpson didn't kill his wife').^{13, 14}

Turning now to MDAs, and given my spelling out the core meaning (tied to their falling within the class of judgments rather than evidentials), any consideration of their truth-conditional contribution gets beside the point. Not only implicatures but basic explicatures as well come with certain strength (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1997). Mišković-Luković (2009) considers one such instance, namely, the case of an inferentially developed

13 There is, additionally, another element relevant for understanding utterances in (13); it concerns legalese (i.e. the difference between murder in the first-degree and manslaughter) and lies outside the scope of my paper.

14 In this paper I ignore negation (e.g. in the form *that's not true* or *it is not the case that [...]*) as typically applicable to verification of the truth-evaluable status of an expression employed in an utterance because it has no significant bearing on my argumentation.

weak basic implicature whenever P hosts the procedural expressions *sort of* or *kind of*. There is no reason then not to suppose that languages may have resources to encode meaning relevant for the construction of a strong basic explicature. This they may do in two ways: either by directly contributing their *procedural* meaning to the basic explicature (akin to the *sort of* and *kind of* marking the weakness of the basic propositional content) or indirectly, by contributing their *conceptual* meaning to the formation of the higher-level explicatures such that the embedded (basic) explicature cannot be but strongly communicated. In the case of MDAs, as I have argued, the basic explicature comes with the strongest degree at face value. Surely then, the issue of truth-functionality has to be taken off the table.

4.2.3. SOCIOPRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS

Bringing into my account the sociopragmatic aspect of communication, I take, intuitively, the MDA *surely* (and Serbian *svakako*) as the best representative of this subclass of judgements (or, at least, the most convenient to facilitate a better understanding of my argumentation). This MDA is entrenched, so to speak, in interactional challenges¹⁵, frequently occurring in the environment of the discourse marker *but* (see Mišković-Luković 2006a for an exhaustive relevance-theoretic analysis of *but*). The following examples (including example (5) in section (2)) illustrate:

- (14) A: There were several gardeners at work who touched their forlocks as we passed.
B: Michael wouldn't believe such a legend, surely.
- (15) "All men in the public eye are envied and slandered." I found myself fervently defining Robert. "And surely there never was one more so than the Earl of Leicester."
- (16) It's my family, you know. We're talking about my father. If there is anything strange about the family, I should know it, surely.
- (17) It was a nightmare into which I had strayed. She could not do it. Surely, she could not do it. But why not? Those about her would assure her that she must.
- (18) A: You and I together for the rest of our lives on the Island. Together we'd make it into a paradise.
B: But, surely, if two people are in love, where they live is not important.

What is interactionally transacted here is the speaker's explicit antagonism to a potential disclaimer of her stance about her (subjective) epistemically strongest P. This, coupled with an attendant element of a seemingly genuine surprise ('How can anyone doubt P'), forms part of a manipulative discursive strategy *par excellence*: in a single stroke of her MDA paintbrush, the speaker aims at precluding any opposition to P and, simultaneously, forewarning about the cost of such an interactional move

¹⁵ *Interactional challenges* are broadly conceived of to include speaker's musings (i.e. self-talking) as in fictional prose.

(cf. Brown and Levinson 1988 for politeness issues, especially in relation to the addressee's loss of negative face). The bottom line is that the speaker's seeks the addressee's compliance.

Getting back to the main notions presented in section (4.1), and to wrap up my line of argumentation, the cognitive-inferential side of the communicative coin is not divorced from its social side. In other words, the relevance of the speaker's interactional use of an MDA lies in ensuring the success of her informative intention by representing P as mutually manifest in the imposed mutual cognitive environment.

The final point that remains to be addressed in this paper is the relevance-theoretic strict conceptual/procedural dichotomy.¹⁶ Both Fraser (1996) and Grice (1989) are on the same track: *signalling* in relation to (potential) communicative intentions (Fraser)¹⁷ and giving precedence to the intentional speaker meaning over the linguistically encoded meaning (Grice). My hypothesis is that MDAs, on the basis of their linguistically encoded conceptual meaning, automatically trigger the formation of the strong implicated conclusion – in a *procedural* way – whereby the deductive process (i.e. from premises to conclusions) is *signalled* (or *indicated*) as cancelled or, at least, suspended because the inferential shortcut has conceptually been provided (along the lines: either the speaker's P *as is*, or the addressee's compliance with the speaker's P).

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper, I have presented two influential approaches to my subject matter, and have looked at their theoretical strength and weakness. I have proposed a middle path, by adopting the proposal from Bennett (2002) about judgements. Having thus delimited the cognitive domain of MDAs, I moved to a modified relevance-theoretic account of how MDAs achieve their semantic and pragmatic roles in communication by bringing together all the important aspects: linguistic, inferential and social. My aim was to show how such expressions could become explainable without a residue (due to specific considerations of different theoretical approaches) so that, if “juggled” one against the other, their proper account might, nonetheless, remain in force (to a significant degree).

A promising line for contrastive studies lies in further exploration into the interplay of cognitive and interactional meanings of MDAs. In addition to (dis)proving, but, certainly, fine-tuning my revised account of the standard relevance-theoretic approach, such studies may shed more light on the remaining controversial issue of the strict conceptual/

16 This has been my long-standing issue with the standard relevance-theoretic account of linguistically encoded phenomena (cf. Mišković-Luković 2006b for an account of the English expression *in other words*).

17 However, Fraser's *communicative* intention does not coincide with the relevance-theoretic notion.

procedural dichotomy (i.e. a linguistic item encodes either conceptual or procedural meaning). As regards truth-conditional semantics, I do not expect significant changes to my account once my long-standing argumentation has finally set in.

References

- Bennett 2002: P. Bennett, *Semantics: An introduction to non-lexical aspects of meaning*, Muenchen: Lincom.
- Blakemore 1987: D. Blakemore, *Semantic constraints on relevance*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Blakemore 2004: D. Blakemore, *Relevance and linguistic meaning*, Cambridge: CUP.
- Brown and Levinson 1988: P. Brown, S. C. Levinson, *Politeness: Some universals in language usage*, Cambridge: CUP.
- Carston 2002: R. Carston, *Thoughts and utterances*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Fraser 1996: B. Fraser, Pragmatic markers, Antwerp: *Pragmatics*, 6/2, Antwerp, 167–190.
- Grice 1989: P. H. Grice, *Studies in the way of words*, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
- Mišković-Luković 2006a: M. Mišković-Luković, *Semantika i pragmatika iskaza: markeri diskursa u engleskom jeziku*, Beograd: Filološki fakultet.
- Mišković-Luković 2006b: M. Mišković-Luković, Reformulation markers: Do they mean what they say?, in: K. Rasulić and I. Trbojević (eds.), *ELLSII75 Proceedings* (vol. I), Belgrade: Faculty of Philology, 359–369.
- Mišković-Luković 2009: M. Mišković-Luković, *Is there a chance that I might kinda sort of take you out to dinner?* The role of the pragmatic particles *kind of* and *sort of* in utterance interpretation, *Journal of pragmatics*, 41/3, 602–625.
- Mišković-Luković 2010: M. Mišković-Luković, Markers of conceptual adjustment: Serbian *baš* and *kao*, in: M. N. Dedaić and M. Mišković-Luković (eds.), *South Slavic discourse particles*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 65–89.
- Mišković-Luković and Dedaić 2010: M. Mišković-Luković, M. N. Dedaić, South Slavic discourse particles: Introduction, in: M. N. Dedaić and M. Mišković-Luković (eds.), *South Slavic discourse particles*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1–22.
- Mišković-Luković and Dedaić 2012: M. Mišković-Luković, M. N. Dedaić, The discourse marker *odnosno* at the ICTY: A case of disputed translation in war crime trials, *Journal of pragmatics*, 41/10, 1355–1377.
- Mišković-Luković, Dedaić, Polomac 2015: M. Mišković-Luković, M. N. Dedaić, V. Polomac, The meaning and interpretation of the Serbian discourse marker *bre*, *Journal of pragmatics*, 87, 18–30.
- Mišković-Luković 2015/2018: M. Мишковић-Луковић, *Праїмаїїшка*, Крагујевац: Филолошко-уметнички факултет.
- Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: D. Sperber, D. Wilson, *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. Oxford: Blackwell.

**Мирјана М. Мишковић-Луковић / ЧВРСТО САОПШТИТИ САГОВОРНИКУ:
МАНИФЕСТНИ АДВЕРБИЈАЛИ ДИСКУРСА – РЕЕВАЛУАЦИЈА ПРИСТУПА**

Резиме / Предмет рада су енглески адвербијални, парентетикални изрази, који имају синонимне еквиваленте у српском језику (нпр. *јасно, очигледно/очигледно, сигурно, свакако, несумњиво* и сл.). Рада је, превасходно, теоријски по усмерењу, јер има за циљ преиспитивање два утицајна приступа овој проблематици: Фрејзерову анализу „прагматичких маркера” и стандардни приступ теорије релеванције у анализи „реченичних адвербијала”.

Налазећи ослонац у селективно истакнутим појмовима инференцијалних приступа комуникацији (тј. Грајсовом и теорије релеванције), као и Бенетовом разграничењу евиденцијала од говорниковог просуђивања, рада – теоријски и методолошки – доводи у везу језички кодирано значење, допринос истинским условима пропозицији говорниковог исказа, као инференцијалну и социопрагматичку улогу испитиваних језичких феномена.

У раду се закључује следеће:

- језичко кодирање: примарно – концептуално, секундарно – процедурално (секундарно аутоматски (тј. несвесно) произлази из примарног;
- допринос истинским условима: ирелевантно
- инференцијално-прагматички допринос: формирање експликатуре вишег нивоа (примарно), формирање јаког закључка (секундарно);
- интеракциони циљ: обезбеђивање беспоговорне сагласности саговорника.

Теоријски циљ рада и има свој будући практични аспект: проверу закључака у сепаратним језицима, као и проверу закључака у контрастивној анализи парова језика.

Кључне речи: когнитивна прагматика, адвербијали дискурса, говорниково просуђивање, узајамна манифестност, релеванције, социопрагматика

Примљен: 30. децембра 2022.

Прихваћен за штампу јануара 2023.