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THE DISCOURSE MARKERS *YOU SEE, YOU KNOW* AND *ACTUALLY* RECONSIDERED: A COGNITIVE-INFERENTIAL ACCOUNT²

Couched within the relevance-theoretic, cognitive-inferential, framework, this paper aims at providing a comparative analysis of the cognitive (i.e. linguistic semantic and pragmatic) configurations and roles of the linguistic expressions *you see*, *you know* and *actually*, which have come to be used as discourse markers. A further, derivative, aim pertains to highlighting their similarities and differences in manipulative types of ordinary conversational exchanges.

Keywords: discourse markers, manipulation, relevance theory, semantics/pragmatics interface, utterance interpretation

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper is envisaged as a snippet of my long-lasting preoccupations with discourse, or pragmatic, markers in general.³ They formed the first testing ground, which has, contentiously, remained part and parcel of the contemporary inferential pragmatics' "Quest for the Holy Grail" – the (later formulated) construct *intermediate phenomenon* (see Mišković-Luković 2011). In essence, the controversy boils down to the issue of the coding/inference (i.e. semantics/pragmatics) border, and, by extension, to the explicit/implicit communication.

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3 A detailed discussion of the terms *discourse* vs. *pragmatic* in relation to a whole gamut of terms, such as *markers*, *particles*, *connectives*, *operators*, *expressions*, *devices*, etc. as used in various inferential and sociolinguistic approaches, is given in Mišković-Luković and Dedaić (2010).

The selected markers *you see*, *you know* and *actually* have, separately, been in the focus of different studies of various theoretic persuasions.⁴ My aim in this paper, however, is not to debate their “core” meanings against the non-inferential approaches, which have painstakingly contributed to a better understanding of their interactional functions (based on corpora). On the contrary! My aim is twofold: crucially, to pin down their cognitive – semantic and pragmatic – roles in communication, and based on this, to highlight their similarities and differences as rhetoric markers of persuasion in manipulative types of discourse in ordinary communication.

It is in this sense that the term *reconsidered* is used in the title of this paper. Nor have the markers been randomly selected – they all exhibit a potential in argumentation based on the speaker’s persuasive appeal to the addressee’s favourable reception of the speaker’s informative intention.

The paper is couched within the relevance-theoretic framework (Sperber and Wilson 1995, Carston 2002) and it follows the relevance-theoretic methodology and practice.⁵ It is organised around the following sections, which bear on my twofold aims: section 2 examines the cognitive roles of the markers; section 3 relates their cognitive roles to their use in manipulative discourse; section 4 wraps up my discussion.

2. THE SEMANTICS/PRAGMATICS INTERFACE

2.1. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

The issue of the semantics/pragmatics interface in relation to discourse markers is essentially the question of particular configurations of their semantic and pragmatic roles in communication. This concerns, principally, their linguistic semantics and pragmatics. Their truth-conditional contribution (otherwise an inseparable element of inferentially oriented analyses) comes as supplementary in properly relevance-theoretic considerations (see Carston 2002; see also Mišković-Luković 2009 for weak explicature marking).

Linguistic semantics, which forms part of the linguistic module (i.e. the parser), only specifies the type of encoding – conceptual or procedural. Conceptually encoded meanings are constituents of the representational

4 Cf., for example, Blakemore (1987, 1996) and Mišković-Luković (2006) for the relevance-theoretic accounts of *you see*, Schiffrin (1996) for an interactional sociolinguistics’ account of *you know*, Östman for a discourse-functional account of *you know* and Smith and Jucker (2000) for a sociopragmatic account of *actually*.

5 For instance, relying on hypothetical examples and using *she* for a speaker and *he* for an addressee. See Blakemore (1987, 1996) for an explanation as to why hypothetical examples (in comparison to the sociolinguistic or sociopragmatic practice of exclusively relying on corpora) are a highly effective means for elucidating the very possibility of human communication, which, then, can be tested in a vast amount of corpora.

content.⁶ By contrast, procedurally encoded meanings are (semantic) constraints on pragmatic inference; that is, they indicate directions in which to seek the optimally relevant interpretation of a speaker's utterance (on the explicit or implicit side of communication).⁷

Pragmatics, a highly powerful mechanism and a submodule within the massively modular mind-reading capacity, (subpersonally) inferentially enriches a logical form yielded by the parser (or, more precisely, as many logical forms as there are ambiguous meanings related to a linguistic form used in an utterance) not only to the level of contextually-sensitive proposition expressed by an utterance (and (basic) explicature) but also to the level of higher explicatures as well as to implicit premises and conclusions – all based on the speaker's (communicative and informative) intention.⁸

It is propositions that are the sole bearers of truth. In other words, a proposition, whether of an explicit or implicit nature, can be true or false *per se*. Traditionally⁹, however, truth conditions have been considered only in relation to the (explicit) proposition expressed by an utterance, or in Grice's terms (1989), to what the speaker is (actually) *saying*. This practice has persisted in describing the meanings of various discourse markers in inferentially conducted studies even of the relevance-theoretic persuasion.¹⁰ Still, taking into account the fact that my selected markers do not function at the level of the proposition expressed/(basic) explicature, I will, academically, resort to this third, supplemental, criterion in fine-tuning their cognitive (semantic and pragmatic) roles.¹¹

6 I.e. of a (schematic) logical form and (when contextually enriched) of the proposition expressed by an utterance/(basic) explicature, or of a higher-level explicature.

7 Linguistic semantics is *autonomous* with respect to pragmatics. It translates linguistic forms to logical forms by relating words to concepts (Carston 2002).

8 On the explicit side of communication, the proposition expressed by a speaker's utterance equals the (basic) explicature only if the speaker is committed to, that is, she guarantees the truth of the proposition her utterance expresses. The proposition expressed, and/or the (basic) explicature, may be embedded under a higher-level description of a various nature (e.g. illocution, attitude, evidence, mood, etc.). On the implicit side, various strong (i.e. crucial for understanding) and weak (i.e. solely dependent on the addressee's further inference) implicit premises and conclusions are formed as part of the speaker's intended, though not encoded, meaning.

9 I am referring to the philosophy of language, formal semantics and inferential pragmatics of a Gricean provenance.

10 Of the three typical diagnostic tests (implication, factive connectives and exclusive disjunction) for the evaluation of a truth-conditional vs. non-truth-conditional contribution of a linguistic item, the widespread, standardly used test is with a negative operator (e.g. *That's not true*, *It is not the case that*, etc.) (cf. Ifantidou 2000), which, paradoxically, is supposed to test the conceptual/procedural distinction within the domain of linguistic semantics.

11 Truth-conditional semantics (i.e. semantics of the real world) specifies the relations between concepts/propositions and entities in the world (Carston 2002). It is in this sense *metaphysical* in contrast to the *cognitive* nature of linguistic semantics and pragmatics.

2.2. THE COGNITIVE ROLES OF *YOU SEE*, *YOU KNOW* AND *ACTUALLY*

2.2.1. The form

You see and *you know* are clauses which typically serve their *main* clause function and require a (syntactic and semantic) completion (of a slot) in the form of an embedded subordinate clause (represented as *P* in (1)):

- (1) You see / You know (that) *P*.

However, apart from functioning as regular clauses, *you see* and *you know* have come to be used as discourse markers, that is, as *parenthetical* clauses (illustrated in (2)):

- (2) a. You see / You know, *P*.
b. *P*, you see / you know.

The apparent differences between the regular and parenthetical clauses are further illustrated in (3):

- (3) a. You saw / You knew (that) Prince Andrew had been under increasing pressure over his links with Jeffrey Epstein.
b. You see / You know (that) Prince Andrew has been under increasing pressure over his links with Jeffrey Epstein.
c. You see / You know, Prince Andrew has been under increasing pressure over his links with Jeffrey Epstein.

The status of a regular clause in (3a), with the VPs *see* and *know* in a past tense, is uncontroversial in that the clause conforms to the traditional semantic principle of compositionality. Translated in contemporary terms, the clauses *you see* and *you know* encode conceptual meaning and have a truth-conditional bearing at the level of the proposition expressed/basic explicature. The present tense of the VPs in (3b), however, imposes an ambiguous interpretation between the regular and parenthetical clausal meanings. This ambiguity is resolved in (3c) where *you see* and *you know* are parenthetical clauses functioning as discourse markers.

This, in effect, means nothing more than concluding that the discourse markers *you see* and *you know* do not contribute to the truth of *P* (for instance, in (3c) *P* = 'Prince Andrew has been under increasing pressure over his links with Jeffrey Epstein'). However, parenthetical clauses (or, more precisely, *epistemic* parenthetical clauses) have typically been regarded as encoding conceptual meaning (probably inherited from their regular clausal meanings) and pragmatically contributing to the higher-level explicature by forming the speaker's attitude to *P*.

Postponing for a while (until the subsection 2.2.2.) my approach to, and comparison of, the cognitive roles of the discourse markers *you see* and *you know*, I turn now to the form of the linguistic item *actually*.

The form *actually* is an adverbial. Example (4) illustrates its VP (i.e. clause-internal) adverbial use, and, concomitantly, conceptual meaning and truth-conditional contribution at the level of the proposition expressed/basic explicature:

- (4) I had a tiff with my daughter-in-law yesterday evening – she actually expected me to wash her laundry!

However, a number of (especially *-ly*) adverbials are used *parenthetically* as conceptual (non-)truth-conditional items which form part of a relevant higher-level explicature (inheriting their conceptual semantics from their clause-internal synonymous counterparts) – the so-called *sentence* or *discourse adverbials*, as illustrated in (5). Or, they may be used as procedural, non-truth-conditional, discourse markers which are indicators of (semantically encoded) inferential constraints on implicatures with no syntactic, semantic or pragmatic correlations, whatsoever, to their *formal* VP counterparts, as illustrated in (6):

- (5)¹² a. Sadly/Frankly, Prince Andrew's 2019 BBC Newsnight interview was widely perceived as a public relation disaster.
b. Apparently/Allegedly, Prince Andrew's 2019 BBC Newsnight interview was widely perceived as a public relation disaster.
c. Theoretically, Prince Andrew's 2019 BBC Newsnight interview was necessary at that time; in practice, it wasn't.

- (6)¹³ a. However hard he tried, Prince Andrew couldn't win a favourable impression out of his 2019 BBC Newsnight interview.

12 Briefly, the sentence adverbial *sadly* (5a), as a representative of attitudinal sentence adverbials, forms the higher-level explicature 'It is a sad eventuality that *P*'. The sentence adverbial *frankly* (5a), as a representative of the majority of illocutionary adverbials, forms the higher-level explicature 'The speaker is saying/suggesting frankly that *P*'. Both are non-truth-conditional linguistic expressions given that they do not modify *P*. By contrast, the evidential sentence adverbial *apparently* (5b), which encodes the speaker's evidence for the reliability of *P* as well as the hearsay adverbial *allegedly* (5b), which encodes that it is not the speaker who is the source of a given piece of information, have a truth-conditional bearing on *P*. On the other hand, the illocutionary adverbials *theoretically* and *in practice* (5c) do contribute to the truth conditions of *P* given that their omission would lead to a contradiction; the reason for this is the fact that they do not modify the illocutionary verb in the higher-level explicature (e.g. *say* or *suggest*) but the very *P* (i.e. 'The speaker says/suggests that theoretically/in practice *P*').

13 Briefly, the VP adverbial *however* in (6a) modifies the VP adverbial *hard* and, therefore, contributes its conceptual meaning and truth-conditional contribution at the level of the proposition expressed/basic explicature (according to the semantic principle of compositionality). By contrast, the discourse marker *however* in (6b) constrains the relevance of the utterance by encoding an adversative (i.e. procedural and non-truth-conditional) meaning such that *P* in the sequence *P. However, Q* is intended to be understood as a denial of an element in *P* (e.g. the implicature derived from *P* that the interview has accomplished the purported aim). See Blakemore (1987, 1996) for a detailed relevance-theoretic account of the connectives *but* and *however*.

b. Prince Andrew intended his 2019 BBC Newsnight interview as a life-saving rope. However, it backfired.

This, surely, begs the question of whether the discourse marker *actually* encodes a conceptual meaning and pragmatically contributes to the formation of a higher-level explicature (i.e. as the case is with the aforementioned *-ly* adverbials in (5)) or it encodes a procedural meaning (i.e. akin to the adverbial *however*, which is ambiguous between conceptual (adverbial) and procedural (discourse marker) meaning) and pragmatically constrains the derivation of an implicature, or something “in between”.¹⁴

So far I have shown that apart from the non-truth-conditional contribution of the selected discourse markers, a mere reliance on the form, including the ensuing discussion, has left the most important question of their cognitive – linguistic semantics and pragmatics – roles in utterance interpretation unanswered. To this question I turn in the following subsection.

2.2.2. The meaning

Deliberately starting this subsection with my conclusion (summarised in table 1) I shall work it down:

DISCOURSE MARKER	LINGUISTICS SEMANTICS	PRAGMATIC CONTRIBUTION
<i>you see</i>	procedural	- Implicit: a semantic constraint on a cognitive effect type: <i>strengthening</i>. - Explicit: a semantic constraint on a higher-level explicature (i.e. the speaker's <i>interpersonal</i> attitude).
<i>you know</i>		Explicit: a semantic constraint on a higher level explicature (i.e. the speaker's <i>interpersonal</i> attitude).
<i>actually</i>		- Implicit: a semantic constraint on a cognitive effect type: <i>contradiction and elimination</i>. - Explicit: a semantic constraint on a higher-level explicature (i.e. the speaker's <i>interpersonal</i> attitude).

Table 1: the configurations of the linguistic semantic and pragmatic roles

In general, according to the relevance-theoretic approach to meaning (in cognition and communication), the category of meaning that falls

¹⁴ Cf. also *well* as a VP adverbial (e.g. *Prince Andrew didn't know Virginia Guifre well (enough).*) vs. the discourse particle meaning (e.g. *Well, Prince Andrew shouldn't have had his arm around Guifre's waist.*). See Blakemore's relevance-theoretic approach (1987, 1996, and elsewhere).

within the domain of procedural (and non-truth-conditional) encoding on the implicit side of communication is either tied to a particular type of cognitive effects or to a particular context selection.¹⁵

The discourse marker *you see* procedurally encodes the information about the sequence *P*. *You see*, *Q*, such that *Q*, which the marker prefaces, is to be understood as a premise that along with the relevant contextual premise the sequence gives access to, *strengthens* the speaker's conclusion given in *P* (illustrated in (7)):

- (7) Prince Andrew's 2019 BBC Newsnight interview was a total flop. *You see*, he only succeeded in turning the public opinion against him.

P ('Prince Andrew's 2019 BBC Newnight interview was a total flop') is the speaker's conclusion strengthened (i.e. confirmed) by the cognitive conjunction of *Q* ('Prince Andrew only succeeded in turning the public opinion against him [i.e. Prince Andrew]') and the relevant contextual assumption 'Interviews are supposed to elicit a favourable impression/opinion about a public persona' (especially those that are typically in the focus of the mass media, e.g. the members of the British royal family). In sum, *you see* constrains the relevance of a speaker's utterance on the implicit side of communication by signalling the cognitive effect of strengthening a previously given proposition (see Blakemore 1987, Mišković-Luković 2006).

This, however, is not an entire "cognitive story" about the marker *you see* given its residue of meaning – a *new/unknown/unavailable* piece of information – signalled by the speaker's prefacing her utterance with *you see* (irrespective of whether her presumption about the addressees' knowledge of (or unavailability) is right or wrong).¹⁶ This begs the crucial questions related to the origin of this element of the procedural meaning and the level at which it *can* surface. My proposal is that it comes from the conceptual meaning of the regular clause (i.e. the use of the perception verb *see*, including its metaphorical extension 'to (perceptually) *see* is to (mentally) *understand*'). And, to resist the otherwise tempting, though erroneous, reverting to a semantic (vs. pragmatic) nature of presuppositions, the only alternative that remains is to conclude that it surfaces at the higher-explicature level as a procedural constraint on the speaker's *interpersonal* attitude.

15 On the one hand, *context* is psychologically construed as a set of mentally represented assumptions (i.e. propositions) which interact with new information (e.g. a speaker's utterance) to yield a particular cognitive effect. Contextual assumptions are selected on the basis of the ostensive-inferential stimulus (e.g. a speaker's utterance) and an addressee's bid for the optimally relevant interpretation. On the other hand, *cognitive effects* (i.e. an addressee's reward for the invested mental process in comprehending a speaker's utterance) come in three types: strengthening an existing assumption, contradicting and eliminating an existing assumption and deriving a conclusion (Sperber and Wilson 1995, Carston 2002).

16 Mišković-Luković (2006) explains the meaning of the discourse marker *you see* as a conjunctive procedural instruction: It is not manifest that $Q \wedge Q$ is evidence for *P*.

The discourse marker *you know*, on the other hand, does not procedurally encode a cognitive effect type (i.e. strengthening, contradiction and elimination or deriving a contextual implication) nor can it encode a context selection. Hence, it is not a marker that pragmatically contributes to the implicit side of communication. Furthermore, given its non-truth-conditional semantics, it cannot be a marker that pragmatically contributes to the proposition expressed/basic explicature. I propose, therefore, that the discourse marker *you know* procedurally constrains the formation of a higher-level explicature of the speaker's *interpersonal* attitude. This, in effect, means that an utterance *you know* prefaces has no relation to the propositional content of the utterance (not even in the ways given for the (conceptual) so-called sentence (or discourse) adverbials in (5)). On the contrary, it is exclusively an addressee-oriented marker. This is why it may be used in connecting propositions (P. *You know*, Q), like the discourse marker *you see*, but need not (*You know*, P), unlike the discourse marker *you see*.

Determining the *specific* procedure encoded by this marker (or for that matter by any of the three selected markers) has not been the aim of this snippet. Östman (1981) and Schiffrin (1996), for instance, offer some quite illuminating proposals based on their different sociolinguistically-informed perspectives.¹⁷ Roughly, however, and for the purpose of this paper, I am tying the procedural meaning of *you know* to encoding *mutual manifestness*.¹⁸ Let us consider example (8):

- (8) The press is crucifying Prince Andrew because of his shenanigans with Epstein. You know, a new conspiracy theory. Mabel and I saw him just the other day in front of the church. Splendid! Positively gorgeous and gentlemanly. And such a good father, too!

Even though the speaker of (8) is, on the whole, obviously, favouring Prince Andrew's position, this need not be manifest to an addressee in advance of the *you know*-utterance. Nor is the propositional content of the *you know*-utterance crucial for an immediate grasping of the speaker's taking sides. *You know* is a good enough signal to pull the addressee, matter-

17 Albeit conflating the encoded (i.e. semantic) type of meaning with corpora usages as is typically the case with non-inferential approaches (given that pragmatics is conceived of not in cognitive terms but as linguistic performance (or 'language in use')).

18 This is a derivative notion stemming from the relevance-theoretic cognitive distinction between *manifestness* (as a lower bound) and *mutual cognitive environment* (as an upper bound). Briefly, an assumption becomes (more or less) manifest to an addressee when he can both mentally represent it and hold it as (probably) true at the reception time (i.e. a speaker's utterance). On the other hand, a speaker and her interlocutors (start to) share a certain ("common") cognitive environment (established, at least, during their talk); if, additionally, they become aware that they really share it (hence the notion of *manifestness*), then each manifest assumption in such an environment simultaneously becomes *mutually* manifest (see Carston 2002). In other words, once mutual manifestness sets in, there is no cognitive escaping from it.

of-factly, into the speaker's point of view, leaving him, at least, receptive to the speaker's expounding her view.¹⁹

A shift from the conceptual to procedural encoding of the linguistic item *actually* is, actually, a fascinating case in point. To start with the obvious, the parenthetically used *actually* in my previous statement (i.e. in the sense 'in effect' or 'really') heavily draws on the conceptual meaning of the corresponding adjectival and VP adverbial (truth-conditional) counterparts whose meaning corresponds to 'actuality', 'reality', 'factivity' (cf. also the prepositional phrase *in actual fact*).²⁰ This *actually* is not the discourse marker *actually* I am reconsidering in this paper (although reliance on *factuality* remains as a key element in the interpersonally encoded, procedural, meaning).

On the implicit side of communication, the discourse marker *actually* falls within the group of cancellative markers whose prototypical representative is *but*. To illustrate, in the sequence *P. But, Q, but* signals that an (explicit or implicit) aspect in *Q* contradicts and eliminates an (explicit or implicit) aspect in *P*:

- (9) Prince Andrew had always had a way with the late Queen. But, he had the temerity to embroil her in that ghastly Epstein scandal.

In (9), for instance, the implicature of *P* (about the late Queen's enduring tolerance for her favourite offspring's behaviour) is being contradicted and eliminated by the implicature of *Q* (the late Queen stopped tolerating her favourite offspring's behaviour). The procedural constraint which the discourse marker *actually* imposes on interpretation is tied to encoding the cognitive effect of contradiction and elimination of an existing assumption, like *but*, but unlike *but* (see (10)) it encodes something else in addition:

- (10) Prince Andrew had always had a way with the late Queen. **Actually*, he had the temerity to embroil her in that ghastly Epstein scandal.

On the explicit side of communication, the additional and no less crucial procedural instruction surfaces at the higher-explicature level by signalling the speaker's orientation to her interlocutor in maintaining a win-win situation in a (potentially) adversative and face-threatening moment in conversational interaction (regarding their discourse topic).²¹ The discourse marker *actually*, as it were, greases the conversational wheels (i.e. as a politeness marker of a sort in anaesthetising the interlocutor's perception of an imminent interactional opposition) before the (disput-

19 Discoursification of *you know* from the regular clause to the parentheticality of a discourse marker rests on the cognitive-epistemic (conceptual) nature of the VP *know*.

20 I.e. it encodes a conceptual and non-truth-conditional meaning.

21 See Pomerantz (1996) for agreeing and disagreeing in conversation. See Brown and Levinson (1988) for politeness phenomena.

able/controversial) point is “resolved” in the speaker’s *actually*-prefaced utterance as “truer”, or more “factual” (i.e. given the vestige of the conceptual (adjectival and adverbial) meaning it draws upon) according to the speaker’s stance to “reality” (i.e. her point of view).

It is not surprising, therefore, that a typical discourse environment in which the marker *actually* occurs is in prefacing a next-speaker’s turn:²²

- (11) A: Dear me, you’ve heard, haven’t you! That American chit has made our Katie cry over bridesmaid dress fittings before their wedding.
B: Actually, it was the other way round. Mabel told me, for sure.

Example (11) illustrates a prejudicial gossip over a tea-time that may have occurred in any of the UK’s villages. Let us suppose that A and B are long-standing neighbours, prone to gossiping, and enjoying their mutual company in their everyday tea-time encounters. B wishing to maintain their usual camaraderie prefaces her opposition to the topic introduced by A. B not only stalls before expressing her opposite view, but is equally preparing A for the (otherwise unusual in their daily face-to-face encounters) adversative position. In other words, the discourse marker *actually* signals B’s delayed opposition and prepares the ground for A’s acceptance of B’s perspective, which in (11) is, additionally, “factually” backed up by reliance on a Mabel (presumably the all-wise villager and A’s and B’s regular gossiping crony).

3. COMPREHENSION AND MANIPULATION²³

The term *least effort* (strategy) succinctly captures the gist of the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy for understanding (non) verbal ostensive-inferential stimuli.²⁴ It operates on a subpersonal level and is triggered by an addressee’s search for optimal relevance such that the mental effort spent in comprehension must be offset by a (satisfying amount of) cognitive reward (i.e. cognitive effects). The addressee sets off his inferential journey by considering various interpretive hypotheses in the ascending order starting from the *most* available/accessible one. And once he has reached an interpretation that satisfies *his* expectations of

22 I.e. not within a speaker’s turn as a marker of self-correction (in contrast to, for instance, the marker *in fact* (cf. Mišković-Luković (2006) for a detailed account of *in fact*)).

23 This section is based on Sperber and Wilson (1995), Sperber (2000), Carston (2002) and Mišković-Luković (2008).

24 In verbal communication, for instance, a speaker, by producing her utterance, an *ostensive-inferential* stimulus, makes it mutually manifest to all the parties involved in a conversational exchange that she intends, by the use of her utterance, to make (more) manifest a certain set of assumptions to her interlocutors.

relevance, the addressee terminates his interpretive process (or else, abandons it altogether if he cannot reach any relevant interpretation).²⁵

In practice, however, and depending on various (objective and subjective) factors (e.g. general cognitive abilities, educational level, training, current mental and/or physical disposition, etc.), an addressee (on a subpersonal level) actuates this general comprehension strategy in a naïve way, or in an optimistic way, or as sophisticated understanding.²⁶ It is only with the latter mode that an addressee *can* deal with cases of manipulation in conversational exchanges.

On the other hand, conversational manipulation is not confined to political discourse no matter how much we are prone to (mentally) collocate *manipulation* with *politics*:

There may not be one *true* way of representing any given event [...] [P]owerful *political players* [my emphasis] attempt to create a situation in which one mode of representation gains primacy over others. [...] In this way, ideological knowledge and meanings are transformed into non-ideological, natural, and universal common sense.

(Chang and Mehan 2006: 1–3)

Furthermore, the relevance-theoretic construct of, in fact, *two* layers of a speaker's intention (contra Grice (1989)) – *informative* and *communicative*²⁷ – becomes twisted in a *politically* manipulative discourse:

The speaker of a manipulative U represents a certain state of affairs so as to influence and model the hearer's beliefs according to her goals. [...] [T]he purported descriptive representation has already been strongly (and covertly) interpretively imbued. [...] So, the informative intention (although distorted) remains intact. [...] [The communicative intention] must remain hidden, in which case manipulative discourse is an instance of covert communication. In fact, what seems to be at work here is a requirement for a highly complex

25 This is, of course, crucially related to an addressee's relevant context-construction (prompted by a speaker's utterance): not by expanding it (due to successively greater processing effort incurred) but by *narrowing* it.

26 If an addressee is in a naïve-comprehending mode, he takes it for granted that the speaker is benevolent and competent in stating that *P* (i.e. when producing her utterance form-/content-wise); therefore, he recovers the first relevant enough interpretation and takes it at face value as speaker-meant. If an addressee is, by contrast, in an optimistic-comprehending mode, he no longer takes the speaker's competence for granted; as a result, he is able to engage in a further metarepresentational level – how the speaker might have thought her utterance would be relevant to him (i.e. he can cope with instances of accidental (ir)relevance). Finally, the sophisticated understanding actuation of the least-effort strategy dispenses with the speaker's benevolence and competence entirely; as a result, yet another metarepresentational level is being formed – what the speaker might have thought how the addressee would think her utterance would be relevant to him. In other words, the outcome of this mode of comprehension is a fourth-order metarepresentation: 'The speaker intends the addressee to believe that the speaker intends the addressee to believe that *P*'.

27 The *informative* intention is a first-ordered intention: a speaker's intention to inform an addressee of *something*. The *communicative* intention is of a higher-order nature: a speaker's intention to inform an addressee of her *informative* intention (Carston 2002).

metarepresentational performance, which [...] is commonly difficult to screen unless we are indeed actively participating addresses (perceptive, engaged and even trained).

(Mišković-Luković 2008: 195)

To top off my theoretical considerations in this section, I refer to the *deception detector* (Mišković-Luković 2008) that bears on Sperber's (2000: 136) *logico-argumentative module* – a protective response to a conversational risk (given that interlocutors may (mis)inform, persuade and give arguments regardless of the truth/falsity of the propositions expressed by their utterances): “[It is] a means to filter communicated information, and, on the other hand, [...] to penetrate the filters of others.”²⁸

3.1. THE DISCOURSE MARKERS AT WORK

People constantly engage in verbal encounters as speakers and addressees. In both roles, they are more or less successful in producing and understanding messages put across a conversational table (e.g. alertness to a specific topic, tiredness, boredom, illness, etc.). Whether we like it or not, discursive manipulation permeates our daily exchanges, though on a far smaller scale (in comparison to political discourse) and for various petty reasons:

The speaker of a manipulative U represents a certain state of affairs as to influence and model the hearer's beliefs according to her goals. [...] So, the informative intention (although distorted) remains intact. But how about the communicative intention?

(Mišković-Luković 2008: 195)

In contrast to politically-imbued manipulative discourse (to which the above quotation actually refers), the communicative intention in ordinary instances of manipulative discourse is overtly signalled by the use of the three discourse markers as (part of (i.e. for *you see* and *actually*)) their encoded meanings procedurally constraining the speaker's *interpersonal* stance to her addressee.²⁹

Following Chang and Mehan's (2006) classification of the modes of representation, modified in Mišković-Luković (2008),³⁰ I regard the three markers as falling within a group of linguistic expressions representative

28 More precisely, Sperber (2000) refines the relevance-theoretic “architecture of the mind” by positing a third mental mechanism (or module) apart from the (linguistic) parser and pragmatics – the *logico-argumentative* module, which has evolved as a protective response to various sorts of manipulation.

29 This, of course, does not mean that the markers are not employed in political speeches. Lacking, however, qualitative and quantitative analyses, this issue remains as a further topic for investigation across languages.

30 I.e. religious (i.e. mythical-historical), legalistic and rational, with the latter branching off into technocratic and intellectual.

of the *rational-technocratic* mode of representation in verbal communication.³¹ In other words, *you see*, *you know* and *actually* interactionally function as indicators of a speaker's rhetorical persuasion, or more precisely, by "highjacking" the addressee's perspective so as to make it as close as possible to the speaker's – all of this under the guise of an *apparent* objectivity purportedly sourced-off (e.g. from the speaker's knowledge-/experience-base). On the other hand, the interactional differences in use among the three markers regarding how the speaker's manipulative gambit is, in fact, being executed, depend on their respective cognitive meanings, which may become fine-tuned in the inferential process of routinisation based on the frequency of their usages in certain (i.e. favoured/default) contexts.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

I have deliberately chosen to set aside two distinct distributional environments in which *you see*, *you know* and *actually* may occur in conversation. The one concerns their use in the declarative mood as opposed to the use of *you see* and *you know* as tags in the interrogative and exclamative moods (e.g. *Prince Andrew wasn't aware of the damage he'd done to the royal family in the BBC Newsnight interview, you know/(don't) you see?*). The other concerns their (structural) parentheticality (i.e. their middle and final positions; cf., for example, the title of the well-known British film (2003) "Love(,) Actually").

The aim of my snippet has been, first and foremost, to draw attention to a small group of frequently used English expressions that have a common denominator of a rhetorical potential in argumentation for the purposes of persuasion and manipulation based on (actual or assumed) factivity. I have, therefore, reanalysed the cognitive roles of *you see*, *you know* and *actually* in an addressee's inferential process in comprehending a speaker's utterance, and, furthermore, recast these cognitive roles – interactionally – in terms of their discursive use in manipulative types of everyday interaction.³²

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31 This mode is ahistorical, factual and pragmatic (*pragmatic* in layman's terms).

32 The three discourse markers are also used as conversational fillers (as the case is with many other discourse markers). Hesitation phenomena, however, do not fall within the scope of this paper.

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Mirjana M. Mišković-Luković / PONOVRNO RAZMATRANJE MARKERA DISKURSA
YOU SEE, YOU KNOW I ACTUALLY: KOGNITIVNO-INFERENCIJALNI PRISTUP

Rezime / Predmet našeg rada čine engleski izrazi *you see* ('vidiš'/'vidite'), *you know* ('znaš'/'znate') i *actually* ('u stvari'/'zapravo') kada su u funkciji markera diskursa. Iz perspektive kognitivno-inferencijalne teorije relevancije, preispitujemo njihove semantičke i pragmatičke konfiguracije u tumačenju iskaza. Naše nalaze potom povezuje sa njihovom interpersonalnom ulogom retoričkih markera u manipulativnim (apolitičkim) vidovima konverzacijske razmene.

Ključne reči: markeri diskursa, manipulacija, teorija relevancije, semantičko-pragmatički interfejs, interpretacija iskaza

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