Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://scidar.kg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/22042
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dc.contributor.authorTodorović, Nada-
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-29T14:16:26Z-
dc.date.available2025-01-29T14:16:26Z-
dc.date.issued2024-
dc.identifier.isbn9788676231430en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://scidar.kg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/22042-
dc.descriptionRad je rezultat naučnoistraživačkog rada autora u okviru Programa istraživanja Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Kragujevcu za 2024. godinu, koji se finansira iz sredstava Ministarstva nauke, tehnološkog razvoja i inovacija Republike Srbije.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe common goal of leading corporate actors in a company (shareholders, managers, employees) is the creation of new values and optimization of profit. There are multiple outcomes of employees’ ownership which are underlined in a number of empirical studies that analyzed the effects of employees’ ownership. Dual legal and economic status of employees can cause a conflict of interest among minority and majority shareholders, or employed and unemployed shareholders, or employed shareholders and management. Employees’ ownership has a direct impact on employment security, stability of job position, work motivation, team organization and horizontal workplace surveillance. Company’s employees, who are at the same time its shareholders, have more appreciation for stable performance reflected more in higher productivity and efficiency of business activities than in company’s growth. In the Republic of Serbia, the employees’ shareholding is manifested in different forms which are governed by company’s regulations, but in practice they actually do not exist. In addition to owning shares, which is the direct form of employees’ ownership, the employees may have share options which offer a variety of combinations of risk and profit. Modern companies, as well as corporate law, have upgraded the institutes which validate employees’ economic interests. However, in economic theories there are some opposing arguments which are not in favor of employees’ ownership.en_US
dc.language.isosren_US
dc.publisherFaculty of Law, University of Kragujevacen_US
dc.relation.ispartofZbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Kragujevcu, Knj. 1en_US
dc.rightsCC0 1.0 Universal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/*
dc.subjectemployees’ ownershipen_US
dc.subjectcompany’s performanceen_US
dc.subjectefficiencyen_US
dc.subjectgrowthen_US
dc.subjectshare optionsen_US
dc.titleUTICAJ VLASNIŠTVA ZAPOSLENIH NA POSLOVANJE KOMPANIJAen_US
dc.title.alternativeEFFECTS OF EMPLOYEES’ OWNERSHIP ON COMPANY’S BUSINESS ACTIVITYen_US
dc.typebookParten_US
dc.description.versionPublisheden_US
dc.identifier.doi10.46793/7623-143-0.659Ten_US
dc.type.versionPublishedVersionen_US
Appears in Collections:Faculty of Law, Kragujevac

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