UNILATERALIZAM I MEĐUNARODNO JAVNO PRAVO

Abstract

This paper examines the evolving relationship between multilateralism and unilateralism in contemporary international public law, with the central research question focused on whether the current age of unilateralism represents the terminal stage of the multilateral legal order established after 1945 in the bipolar world and relatively maintained during the unipolar period from 1990 to 2008. The author starts from the premise that the international community, despite structural asymmetries and power hierarchies, is fundamentally a legal community based on multilateralism as its core organizing principle. Multilateralism is presented not merely as a technical method of cooperation but as a foundational legal principle embedded in the post-World War II international legal order through the United Nations Charter and the system of collective security. The paper traces the historical evolution of multilateralism from early bilateral treaty practices and the Westphalian system, through the Vienna Congress of 1815 and the emergence of early international organizations, to its full legal institutionalization after 1945. Special attention is devoted to the positive effects of multilateralism in key areas of international law: state responsibility, the prohibition of the use of force, interventionism, international economic relations, and environmental protection. The transformation of state responsibility from a strictly bilateral concept into a community-oriented regime through obligations erga omnes is highlighted as one of the most important legal achievements of the multilateral order. The analysis of coercion is central to the paper. The author distinguishes between lawful collective coercion and prohibited unilateral coercion, emphasizing that international law strictly limits the use of armed force to self-defense and collective security measures authorized by the UN Security Council. The paper further explains the narrow legal definition of “force” as exclusively military in nature, while broader forms of coercion—especially economic coercion—remain legally ambiguous and deeply contested. Economic sanctions, trade restrictions, and financial measures are analyzed as contemporary instruments of non-violent coercion that increasingly replace military force, but often operate at the margins or outside the multilateral legal framework. The paper also addresses unilateral sanctions, particularly those targeting individuals, and critically evaluates their compatibility with fundamental principles of international law such as sovereignty, non-intervention, and jurisdictional limits. It is argued that unilateral coercive measures with extraterritorial effects pose a serious challenge to the multilateral legal order and risk undermining the integrity of international law itself. In the concluding analytical section, the author engages with contemporary theories on the decline of the U.S.-backed international order. Drawing on the idea that post-1945 multilateralism was structurally intertwined with American hegemonic power, the paper argues that the current resurgence of unilateralism reflects not merely episodic deviations but a deep structural transformation of the international legal system. The weakening of the alliance between dominant power and international law leads to erosion of legal institutionalism, fragmentation of norms, and selective compliance with multilateral obligations. Nevertheless, the paper does not conclude that international law itself is in terminal decline. Instead, it suggests that while the current phase of unilateralism may indeed mark the end of a specific historical model of multilateralism rooted in U.S. dominance, it simultaneously opens a transitional phase toward a more fragmented, pluralistic, and multipolar legal order. In this emerging configuration, international law will continue to exist, but its content, authority, and institutional mechanisms will increasingly reflect dispersed centers of power and competing normative visions.